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Abstract: 
Physically attractive individuals achieve greater success in terms of earnings and 
status than those who are less attractive.  However, much about the mechanism 
behind this “beauty premium” remains unknown. We use a rich dataset to shed 
light on its nature at the college level. We find that students judged to be more 
attractive perform significantly worse on standardized tests but, conditional on 
test scores, are not evaluated more favorably at the point of admission. 
Controlling for test scores, more attractive students receive marginally better 
grades in some cases. Finally, there is substantial beauty-based sorting into areas 
of study and occupations. 
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I. Introduction 
In most settings, discrimination based on characteristics such as gender, age, race, and 
national origin is illegal. Appearance-based discrimination, while not currently unlawful, has 
been the subject of several lawsuits in recent years. 1 In parallel, the academic literature has 
documented a positive correlation between earnings and perceived attractiveness for both men 
and women (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; Biddle and Hamermesh, 1998).2 However, much 
about the mechanism behind this “beauty premium” remains unknown, including the extent to 
which beauty is a signal of innate or acquired ability, the extent of bias in favor of more 
attractive people, and the extent to which sorting plays a role. 
In this paper, we use a unique and rich dataset to examine the nature of the beauty 
premium among students at an all-women’s college. Our principal goals are (1) to test whether 
attractive students appear more academically capable when they begin college, as measured by 
their standardized test scores and admission ratings; (2) to test whether they appear more capable 
when they graduate, as measured by their GPA; and (3) to estimate the extent of beauty-based 
sorting into areas of study and occupations, a potentially important beauty premium mechanism. 
                                                     
1 See for example Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) and Brice v. Resch and Krueger Int’l, 
Inc. (Corbett, 2011). 
2 The importance of beauty has been studied in contexts other than the labor market. See, for 
example, Ravina (2009) for the beauty premium in credit markets, Andreoni and Petrie (2008) 
for the beauty premium in public goods games, Wilson and Eckel (2006) for the beauty premium 
in trust games and Berggren et al. (2010) for the beauty premium in electoral outcomes. 
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To achieve these objectives, we estimate the relationships between attractiveness, standardized 
test scores, course grades, admissions scores, and major/career choices. 
We find that, even though the admissions committee does not observe applicant 
appearance, more attractive individuals receive lower scores on the college’s own formula for 
rating applicants, in this context an important measure of overall applicant quality that reflects a 
very wide range of student characteristics. This finding is completely explained by the fact that 
more attractive individuals have lower standardized test scores. Specifically, a one standard 
deviation (s.d) increase in attractiveness is associated with scoring 0.10 s.d. lower on the math 
SAT section, 0.14 s.d. lower on the verbal SAT section, and 0.45 s.d. lower on the SAT writing 
section. To our knowledge, our study is the first to find that attractiveness is negatively 
correlated with ability, as measured by these tests. Once we control for math and verbal SAT 
scores, we find no relationship between the college’s admission scores and attractiveness. In 
addition to showing that more attractive individuals do not appear to be more capable at the 
beginning of college, the absence of such a relationship implies that the negative correlation 
between attractiveness and SAT scores among admitted students is unlikely to be driven by 
preferential treatment of attractive students during the admissions process. 
Once we control for SAT scores and the admission rating, our results show that more 
attractive women have a marginally higher overall GPA. We show that this is most likely driven 
by sorting into types of courses: after controlling for a rich set of course characteristics, our 
analysis shows no significant relationship between course-level grades and attractiveness, 
although estimates for some course types are marginally significant. 
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If more attractive people are aware of the beauty premium in the labor market, they may 
respond by sorting into areas of study or occupations where their attractiveness generates higher 
returns. Indeed, we find that there is substantial beauty-based selection into study areas. 
Specifically, more attractive women are considerably less likely to major in the sciences and 
much more likely to major in economics. We find no corresponding selection into humanities, 
other social sciences, or another group of majors that we label “area studies.” Overall, we 
conclude that the beauty premium at the undergraduate level is largely attributable to selection 
into study areas rather than ability or bias in favor of more attractive students.  
Finally, we estimate the extent of beauty-based selection into various occupational 
categories. Consistent with our results on academic major selection, we find that more attractive 
women are much more likely to become consultants and managers and much less likely to 
become scientists and technical workers (including paralegals, technical writers, technicians, and 
computer programmers). Because previous work has shown that earnings vary substantially by 
major and occupation, this suggests that at least part of the beauty premium in the labor market is 
explained by major/occupational choice.3 
We contribute to several streams of literature. The first assesses the relationship between 
attractiveness and ability; it has thus far produced mixed findings. Using assortative mating 
                                                     
3 For more on the relationship between earnings and academic major choice, see Daymont and 
Andrisani (1984), Berger (1988), James et al. (1989), Grogger and Eide (1995),  Loury and 
Garman (1995), Loury (1997), Blundell (2000),  Bratti and Mancini (2003), Arcidiacono (2004), 
Kelly et al. (2010), Arcidiacono et al.(2011), Andrews et al. (2012), and  Wiswal and Zafar 
(2012). 
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arguments and observed facts, Kanazawa and Kovar (2004) provide indirect evidence suggesting 
why beauty and intelligence should be positively correlated in humans. Satoshi (2011) shows 
empirically that there is a positive association between IQ test results and physical attractiveness 
in British and American children of both sexes. Several studies have also found that body 
symmetry is positively correlated with cognitive performance (Prokosch et al. 2005, Bates 
2007).4 However, in a sample of American men, Scholz and Sicinski (2011) find no relationship 
between attractiveness and IQ or high school class rank. In a laboratory experiment, Mobius and 
Rosenblat (2006) show that more attractive subjects do not perform better in a maze-solving 
task. In another experimental setting, Deryugina and Shurchkov (2013) use labor-market-
relevant tasks to test for both the existence of a beauty premium and performance differentials 
between less and more attractive subjects. They find that there is no significant performance 
differential by attractiveness related to any of the tasks. 
To our knowledge, our study is the first to consider the relationship between 
attractiveness and SAT scores. Although standardized test scores have been shown to be 
correlated with broad measures of intelligence and cognitive ability (Frey and Detterman, 2004; 
Beaujean et al., 2006; Rohde and Thompson, 2006; Koenig et al., 2008), we do not claim to 
show that more attractive students are less intelligent. More conservatively, our results imply 
that, even if there is a correlation between attractiveness and fundamental intelligence, it does not 
translate into higher test scores. To the extent that both intelligence and effort are necessary to 
score well on standardized tests, it is possible that more attractive people perform worse on 
                                                     
4 Body symmetry has been shown to be strongly correlated with attractiveness (see e.g., Rhodes 
et al. 1999, Rhodes 2006). 
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aptitude tests despite being more intelligent. Our finding suggests that, if more attractive people 
are more intelligent, they may invest less time and effort in human capital formation, at least 
along the dimensions we study (SAT scores and GPA). Alternatively, more attractive students 
may expect to be more likely to get into college, conditional on their SAT scores, and may 
therefore rationally exert less effort preparing for standardized tests. Although we cannot test 
expectations directly, we show that more attractive students do not receive higher admissions 
scores in our data. 
We also contribute to the broad body of literature on the beauty premium. Despite 
numerous papers on the subject (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994, Biddle and Hamermesh 1998, 
Fletcher 2009, Ravina 2009, Mocan and Tekin 2010, Berggren et al. 2010, Berri et al. 2011, 
Scholz and Sicinski 2011, von Bose 2012), much remains to be understood about the beauty 
premium. In particular, with the exceptions of Scholz and Sicinski (2011) and von Bose (2012), 
neither its origins nor persistence has been studied. Moreover, with the exception of Fletcher 
(2009), the extent to which the beauty premium is driven by differences in ability has not been 
explicitly estimated. In a sample of high-ability law students, Biddle and Hamermesh (1998) find 
that there are no observable skill differences (including LSAT scores) between more and less 
attractive individuals. However, von Bose (2012) shows that more attractive teenagers receive 
higher high school GPAs than less attractive ones. Our findings do not definitively resolve 
whether more attractive individuals are more capable of academic achievement; while more 
attractive students perform worse on standardized tests, they are not viewed more or less 
favorably by admissions officers overall and at best earn marginally higher grades than their less 
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attractive peers.  However, we find strong support for another hypothesis about the beauty 
premium mechanism: sorting. 
The policy implications of our findings hinge on whether the observed sorting is efficient. 
It would be efficient, for example, if more attractive students are selecting into certain majors 
and occupations because of productivity expectations. If, on the other hand, the sorting is due to 
attractive students’ anticipating a pro-beauty bias in some professions then it may not be optimal 
from a social point of view. This line of inquiry falls outside the scope of this paper. However, it 
is worthwhile to note that even if the observed sorting is not socially optimal, policies designed 
to prevent it would most likely be impracticable. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes our sample and data. 
Section III outlines the empirical strategy. Section IV presents and discusses the findings. 
Section V concludes. 
II. Data 
Our dataset consists of 794 alumnae who graduated from an anonymous women’s college 
between the years 2002 and 2011.5 To measure attractiveness, we use pictures taken when the 
alumnae were first-year students. A key advantage of our data is that the pictures are not chosen 
by the student: all are photographed for their student ID cards by campus officials. The pictures 
were subsequently rated by current male and female students from a college in another state. 
                                                     
5  This study was conducted with IRB approval. Individuals had to consent to have their 
photographs included in the study. About 5,000 alumnae were contacted for consent. Informed 
consent form and description of the project sent to the alumnae are available upon request. 
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Each picture was rated by at least 25 male and 25 female raters. We then demean the ratings to 
remove rater fixed effects and average them to obtain the mean attractiveness rating of each 
alumna. Due to the large number of alumnae, not every picture was rated by the same set of 
raters. For additional details about the rating procedure, see Appendix A. 
The attractiveness rating is then matched to the alumna’s academic record, which 
includes her major, SAT scores, course-level grades, race, non-merit-based financial aid awards, 
international status, and scores from a quantitative reasoning (QR) test that all first-year students 
are required to take. Like the SAT, the QR test is scored blindly, without observing the test-
taker’s appearance. Moreover, we observe each student’s admission rating, as assigned by three 
or more application reviewers. With few exceptions, application reviewers do not observe the 
student’s appearance.6 At the request of the college, we use a non-disclosed linear transformation 
to disguise the true rating scale. Finally, we have detailed characteristics for each course, 
including department, course level (introductory, intermediate, or advanced), total enrollment, 
and the gender of the instructor. 
Starting in the fall semester of 2004, the college implemented an anti-grade-inflation 
policy that capped the average grade in introductory and intermediate courses with ten or more 
                                                     
6 Some international applicants have TOEFL scores that are accompanied by a picture. In some 
cases, applicants are interviewed by a member of the admissions staff or by an alumna.  
However, the application reviewers have access only to the interviewer’s comments, which do 
not contain information about the applicant’s appearance. 
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students to a B+.7 This policy change disproportionately affected humanities courses. If there is 
beauty-based selection into humanities courses, this policy change may bias our estimates. To 
control for the potential impacts of the anti-grade inflation policy, we identify departments that 
had average grades exceeding a B+ and label beginning and intermediate courses with more than 
ten students in those departments as “treated.” We then control for the treated indicator and its 
interaction with a “post-fall-semester-2004” indicator in all course-level regressions. 
To create our course-level controls and test for sorting, we classify the courses and 
majors offered at the college into six categories: humanities, sciences, social sciences, area 
studies, economics, and other. To do this, we use a publication provided by the college, which 
classifies courses and majors into “Humanities,” “Social Sciences,” “Science and Mathematics,” 
and “Interdepartmental Programs.” Because the “Interdepartmental Programs” category contains 
a significant share of the majors, we reclassify some of them into the first three categories. In 
addition, we classify majors such as “South Asia Studies” and “German Studies,” which are 
originally listed as interdepartmental into a new “Area Studies” category. We place economics in 
its own category because the college does not have a separate business major. Thus, the students 
who elect to study economics may be different from students choosing other social sciences as 
their major. The courses and majors that do not fit into any of the above categories are classified 
as “Other.” See Appendix B for the exact classification. 
Finally, data on occupations come from alumnae surveys and are available for slightly 
over half of the alumnae in our sample. We categorize occupations into ten broad categories: 
                                                     
7 The full impact of the anti-grade-inflation policy has been analyzed by Butcher, McEwan, and 
Weerapana (2013). 
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consultant/manager, administrator, art/advertising, teacher, technical, scientist, lawyer, doctor, 
other medical, and non-profit/government. In a few cases, the categories overlap: someone who 
is working in an administrative position in a non-profit would be placed in both categories, for 
example. There are a few alumnae reporting occupations that cannot be classified into one or 
more of these categories, because the occupation descriptions are either vague or very unique. 
Although we cannot list the specific occupations due to confidentiality concerns, we provide a 
general list of occupations in each category in Appendix B. 
Our data are not without limitations. First, we do not observe parental income, a 
potentially important control. However, we do observe the amount of need-based and non-need-
based loans and grants that a student receives, which we use as a proxy for parental income. We 
also do not observe post-college earnings. Thus, we cannot test whether more attractive students 
in our sample also end up earning a higher salary. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the key variables in the data, broken down by 
whether individuals are below or above the median attractiveness rating of -0.03. The 
attractiveness rating itself ranges from -2.7 to 2.4 and has a mean of 0 by construction. The 
admissions ratings range from 0 to 10, with higher ratings corresponding to a higher chance of 
admission. The average GPA in the sample is fairly high, ranging from 3.23 in economics to 3.52 
in area studies. On average, 94% of the students pass the quantitative reasoning test, which is 
scored out of 18 points. The average grant amount is about $50,000. Need-based and other loans 
are substantially smaller, averaging around $1,600 and $700, respectively. 
There are some significant differences between those who are above and those who are 
below the median attractiveness rating. More attractive students are more likely to be 
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Hispanic/Latina and have about $400 more in non-need-based loans. They score significantly 
lower on the math, verbal, and writing sections of the SAT as well as on the QR test. In addition, 
more attractive students have lower admissions ratings, on average. Finally, there are no 
significant differences between the two groups in terms of GPA, need-based loans and grants, or 
other racial categories. We later perform a formal regression analysis to test whether the 
differences in test scores and admissions ratings hold once controls for student characteristics are 
included. 
One potential concern is that the sample of women who consented to participate in our 
study may not represent all students at the college. To test for this, we compare the mean test 
scores, admissions ratings, and year of enrollment for the entire population of alumnae who 
graduated between 2002 and 2011 with those of the consenting group. The results are shown in 
Table 2. Overall, the consenting students have significantly higher test scores and admission 
ratings. They also enrolled in the college about half a year later than the general population of 
students, on average. Because of the necessity to obtain informed consent, we cannot do 
anything to correct for this or test whether there is beauty-based selection. However, as long as 
there is no selection on the relationship between attractiveness and other outcomes, such as test 
scores and GPA, our analysis is valid despite the baseline differences. While we view such 
selection as highly unlikely, we recognize that the validity of our analysis relies on the 
assumption that it did not occur. We also note that the college from which we obtain data is 
fairly selective, as evidenced by the high average SAT scores of admitted students (see Table 2). 
Thus, our study complements some earlier work such as Fletcher (2009), who focuses on 
individuals with high school diplomas only. 
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A final concern is that, because our sample comes from a women’s college, it may not be 
representative of colleges as a whole. Again, this would bias our results only if the beauty 
premium varies by college. The college from which we obtain our data draws from a pool of 
students and faculty similar to those of other top-tier universities and liberal arts colleges. We do 
not see any obvious model of sorting that would cast doubt on the generalizability of our results. 
Moreover, our focus on women complements some earlier work that looks exclusively at men 
(e.g., Biddle and Hamermesh 1998; Scholz and Sicinski 2011). Finally, the prior literature has 
found that the beauty premium exists for both men and women and is similar in magnitude. 
However, replicating the study in a co-educational setting should be an important validation 
exercise. 
III. Empirical framework 
Conceptually, we might expect a positive correlation between attractiveness and academic 
success or, more generally, between attractiveness and some outcome of interest, for several 
reasons. First, attractiveness may be correlated with a particular characteristic, such as 
intelligence, trustworthiness, or confidence. If this characteristic is unobserved or poorly 
measured, omitted variable bias will result, creating a spurious correlation between beauty and 
the outcome of interest. In the context of academic success, if more attractive people are also 
more intelligent, then controlling for intelligence is crucial for isolating the effect of 
attractiveness itself. 
Second, attractiveness may itself be productive in some settings. For example, more 
attractive solicitors may bring in more donations, justifying paying them a higher salary (Landry 
et al. 2006). This mechanism is less likely to apply in a college setting, however. Finally, people 
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may be biased in favor of more attractive individuals, conditional on their characteristics and 
productivity. 
If more attractive people are aware of these channels, they may respond by exerting greater 
effort into their academic work and preparing for relevant tests or sorting into occupations where 
their attractiveness or other characteristics is more productive. Unfortunately, effort in such a 
context is rarely readily observable. However, the richness of our data allows us to test for 
beauty-based sorting into both areas of study and occupations. In addition, we estimate the 
relationships between beauty, aptitude test scores, and course grades to shed light on the other 
channels through which attractiveness may operate. 
In theory, it is possible that a portion of attractiveness can be explained by investment rather 
than inherent beauty. To our knowledge, there is little work addressing the potential endogeneity 
of beauty and virtually no work in this area is able to fully eliminate such endogeneity concerns.8 
We control for race and financial aid in all our regressions, which should eliminate some of the 
components of beauty that may be correlated with socioeconomic characteristics and thus a 
student’s ability to invest in appearing more attractive. Our results are very robust to excluding 
these controls, and our summary statistics suggest that beauty is not strongly correlated with 
most of these characteristics. 
We first estimate the relationship between the attractiveness rating and admission scores. 
Because the admissions committee does not observe applicant appearance directly, any 
                                                     
8 One paper that explicitly considers investment in attractiveness is Hamermesh et al. (2002), 
who find that there is a positive relationship between attractiveness and spending on clothing and 
cosmetics.  
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correlation between attractiveness and the admission rating will be due to more attractive 
students differing in the quality of their recommendation letters, extracurricular activities, 
personal essays, and other application characteristics.  
𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 = 𝛼𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖′𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖                                                     (1) 
where 𝑖  represents the individual alumna and 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖  is the average admission score 
assigned to her by three or more raters. The variable 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖  is the alumna’s attractiveness 
rating, and  𝑋𝑖 is a vector of student characteristics, including math and verbal SAT scores, a set 
of race indicators, the logs of grant and loan amounts, and year-of-enrollment fixed effects. We 
add 1 to the grant and loan amounts prior to taking their logs to avoid missing observations. Our 
results are generally robust to the exclusion of controls for financial aid and race, however. In a 
related specification, we allow the coefficient on the attractiveness rating to vary by 
attractiveness quintile to test for non-linear effects. 
We then estimate the relationship between attractiveness and GPA, controlling for 
standardized test scores, the admissions rating, and student characteristics. 
𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖 = 𝛽𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖′𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖                                                             (2) 
where 𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖 is the student’s grade point average on a 0–4 scale. In this case, 𝛽 may be capturing 
the effect of bias, sorting, or skill differences that are correlated with attractiveness but are not 
adequately controlled for by our ability measures. In theory,  𝛽 may also be capturing direct 
productivity differences associated with attractiveness itself (e.g., a more attractive model or 
actor may earn more money because her attractiveness is more productive). However, we think 
direct productivity differences are highly unlikely to be present in a college setting. 
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In order to remove the influence of some of these factors, we also estimate the relationship 
between attractiveness and course-level grades. Specifically, we include a rich set of course-level 
controls to eliminate any beauty premium driven by differential course choices. 
𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖′𝛿 + 𝑋𝑖′𝜌 + 𝑍𝑗′𝛾 + 𝜃𝑑 + 𝜇𝑎𝑡 + 𝜋𝑇𝑑 + 𝜎𝑇𝑑𝑃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡         (3) 
where 𝑖 indexes individuals, j indexes courses, and t indexes semesters.9 The variable 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 
is the course grade, measured on a 0–4 scale. The vector 𝑍𝑗  is a set of course-level 
characteristics, namely the gender of the instructor, total enrollment (in logs), and whether the 
course is a beginning, intermediate, or advanced course. Finally, 𝜃𝑑 is a set of department fixed 
effects (e.g., English, Mathematics, Physics), and 𝜇𝑎𝑡  denotes course-area-by-semester fixed 
effects (e.g., humanities in Fall 2005, sciences in Spring 2008). The variable 𝑇𝑑  indicates 
whether the department had a grade average exceeding a B+ prior to the implementation of the 
anti-grade-inflation policy and 𝑃𝑡 is equal to one for the fall semester of 2004 and later. Standard 
errors in this specification are clustered by student. 
Finally, we estimate the amount of beauty-based sorting into distinct fields of study, using a 
probit specification. 
𝐼[𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 = 𝑀]𝑖 = 𝛽𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖′𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖                                                 (4) 
where 𝐼[𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 = 𝑀]𝑖 is an indicator equal to 1 if a student 𝑖  is majoring in area M and 0 
otherwise. We estimate this relationship separately for five areas of study: humanities, sciences, 
social sciences, economics, and area studies. The classification of majors into these five areas is 
detailed in Appendix B. We estimate an analogous equation for career choices. 
                                                     
9 Fall semesters in two different years are treated as different semesters. 
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IV. Results  
i. Admission ratings and test scores 
Our first line of inquiry is to test whether attractiveness is correlated with the admission 
rating of the student. This test addresses the important question as to whether more attractive 
applicants differ from less attractive ones prior to college attendance, at least in our sample. 
Although the admissions committee does not observe everything about the applicant, the 
applications contain much more information than is available in our data, including 
extracurricular activities, recommendation letters, and personal essays. Through these, it is 
possible that the admissions committee receives signals about other skills that predict college 
success and that may be correlated with attractiveness. Because the admission rating is assigned 
without observing the student’s appearance, any correlation between the two will be due to 
beauty-based differences in application characteristics, such as those listed above, rather than 
bias. 
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 3. All specifications include controls for the 
year of enrollment, the student’s race, and logs of financial aid amounts by category (need-based 
loans, other loans, and grants), with 1’s added to avoid missing values. Although the admission 
ratings of more attractive students are worse on average (Column 1), we find that this is entirely 
driven by SAT scores. Once we control for math and verbal SAT scores (Column 3), there is no 
relationship between the admission rating and attractiveness. We do not control for the SAT 
writing section score because it was not offered until 2005, and including it would significantly 
reduce our sample size. The non-linear specification in Column 2 shows that the lower admission 
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rating of more attractive applicants is driven mainly by those in the top quintile of attractiveness. 
However, this difference also disappears once we control for SAT test scores (Column 4). Using 
the estimates in Column 3, we can reject a very small beauty premium of 0.044 or larger in 
admissions ratings with 95% confidence, which is equivalent to about 0.68% of the mean 
admission rating. 
Table 3 rules out the possibility that attractiveness is correlated (on net) with characteristics 
that admissions officers can observe but we cannot. It also provides evidence that more attractive 
applicants are not more likely to get into college, all else remaining equal. In fact, if we do not 
condition on SAT scores, more attractive applicants seem less likely to be admitted.  
The fact that more attractive applicants have worse application packages could be driven by 
differential ability, effort, or both. If effort is a factor, then test scores and other components of 
the college application, such as personal essays and extracurricular activities, are endogenously 
determined. As we discuss in more detail below, if effort is costly and the outside options of 
more attractive individuals are superior, it is possible that they will expend less effort on college 
preparation, even if their ability is equal to or exceeds that of their less attractive peers.   
One potential concern with the results in Table 3 is that it is conditional on being admitted to 
the college. While we do not observe the admission ratings of applicants who were not admitted, 
it is highly implausible that more attractive applicants are more likely to be admitted but do not 
have higher admission ratings conditional on getting in, for several reasons. First, the college that 
provided the data does not have a strict numeric cutoff for admissions. The density of admission 
ratings in our sample, shown in Figure 1, confirms this. The distribution looks smooth, with no 
apparent discontinuity. In order for more attractive applicants to be more likely to be admitted in 
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our case, attractiveness would have to increase the chances of the applicant’s being admitted 
conditional on her rating, also implying that the marginal and infra-marginal applicants would 
have to significantly differ from each other. Second, because the admissions committee does not 
observe the applicant’s appearance, it is unlikely that appearance has an effect separate from the 
admission rating. 10 Third, we find no significant relationship between attractiveness and the 
admission rating when we look at students with above-median or below-median admission 
ratings. In addition, we explicitly test whether attractiveness moderates the importance of test 
scores by interacting test scores with the attractiveness rating and find that it does not.11 
The summary statistics in Table 1 along with the results in Table 3 suggest that more 
attractive students perform worse on standardized tests. To test this directly, we estimate the 
relationship between (a) SAT and QR scores and (b) attractiveness. Because these tests are 
scored blindly, there is no concern that examiners are discriminating against or in favor of more 
attractive people. In other words, it is clear that attractiveness does not directly cause a higher 
test score in this case. Rather, any correlation between test scores and attractiveness will reflect 
some unobserved (to us) variable, such as intelligence or effort. 
The results are shown in Table 4. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 show the results of considering a 
simple linear relationship between attractiveness and test scores. A one s.d. increase in 
                                                     
10 Factors that may affect the chance of admission conditional on the admission rating include 
race, the applicant’s place of residence (e.g., Massachusetts versus Nebraska), high school 
quality, parental income, whether the student is the first to go to college in her family, and legacy 
status, among others. 
11 Results are available upon request. 
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attractiveness is associated with a 0.10 s.d. decrease in the individual’s math SAT score, a 0.14 
s.d. decrease in the verbal score, and a 0.45 s.d. decrease in the writing score. Finally, more 
attractive students also score about 0.20 s.d. lower on the first-year QR score. These results are 
very robust to varying the set of included controls. 
In Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8, we show the results of allowing the relationship between 
attractiveness and test scores to vary by attractiveness quintile. For the math SAT section 
(Column 2), there is a sharp and significant drop in scores only for the top attractiveness quintile: 
the most attractive students score about 0.29 s.d. lower than the least attractive students. The 
same pattern holds for the QR test (Column 8). For the verbal section of the SAT, the drop is 
more gradual, with students in the 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles performing significantly and 
progressively worse than students in the bottom quintile. The most attractive students score about 
0.40 s.d. lower than the least attractive students. Finally, we cannot detect any differences by 
quintile on the writing section of the SAT. 
A potential objection to these results is that our sample consists of people who have been 
admitted to the college. If more attractive students have characteristics other than SAT scores 
that are more likely to result in their being admitted, this would lead to a mechanical negative 
correlation between SAT scores and attractiveness among the sample of admitted women. 
However, as we demonstrate in Table 3, the admission scores of more attractive students are not 
higher, providing strong evidence against their being more likely to be admitted. Moreover, 
restricting the sample to students with below-median admission ratings does not substantively 
change our results. Thus, our finding of a negative correlation between attractiveness and SAT 
scores is unlikely to be driven by this type of selection. 
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To our knowledge, the finding that more attractive people perform worse on standardized 
tests is new and adds nuance to the hypothesis that more attractive individuals earn more because 
of some unobservable skill, such as intelligence. In contrast to our results, previous work has 
found that more attractive individuals attain either equal or higher test scores relative to their less 
attractive peers. However, with the exception of Biddle and Hamermesh (1998), who estimate 
the relationship between men’s looks and LSAT scores, previous papers have used tests that aim 
to measure fundamental intelligence, such as IQ tests. SAT scores, on the other hand, are likely 
determined by some inherent skill and by effort, which may explain the difference between our 
findings and previous work. If more attractive individuals generally expect to receive preferential 
treatment in life or have better outside options for other reasons, they may rationally choose to 
exert less effort in advancing their credentials, all else remaining equal. Although some of the 
previous work on beauty has considered beauty-driven selection, none has considered differential 
investment in human capital. Separating differential investment from ability is beyond the scope 
of our data. However, our results highlight an important possibility: even if intelligence and 
attractiveness are positively correlated, the ability of individuals to modify their effort level may 
counteract or even reverse the relationship between outcomes and beauty in settings where effort 
matters. 
ii. Grades  
The estimates in Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate that more attractive students do not begin 
college with better credentials. If anything, more attractive students have lower admission 
ratings, driven by their lower SAT scores. In addition, they subsequently score worse on a first-
year QR test. 
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A natural follow-up question is whether more attractive students end up performing better in 
college than their less attractive counterparts. In other words, is there evidence that the beauty 
advantage develops during college? We should note right away that such better performance 
could occur for a number of reasons: skill, bias on behalf of instructors or classmates, 
endogenous effort, and selection. We try to directly assess some of these factors below. 
Throughout the analysis, we use the math and verbal SAT scores as well as the admission 
rating as ability controls. Again, we do not control for the writing SAT score because it was not 
offered until 2005, and including it would have significantly reduced our sample size. The 
benefit of including the admission rating is that it captures a broader range of skills than SAT 
scores and it appears unaffected by attractiveness. However, our results are unchanged if we omit 
the admission rating from the set of controls.12 
Table 5 shows the relationship between attractiveness and GPA, with and without controlling 
for test scores and the admission rating. We consider both first-year and overall GPA. While the 
latter is a better reflection of overall student performance, the former might be more relevant for 
our attractiveness measure, which reflects student appearance in their first year.13 
                                                     
12 Our results are also generally robust to including state of high school/international student 
fixed effects and to not controlling for the anti-grade-inflation policy. A full set of estimates is 
available upon request. 
13 Although we allow for the possibility that our attractiveness measure is specific to the first 
year, von Bose (2012) finds that attractiveness is highly correlated within an individual over 
time. 
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Overall, there is no significant relationship between a student’s attractiveness rating and her 
first-year GPA, although the quintile specifications indicate that students in the second quintile 
have marginally lower GPAs than students in the first quintile. Even though the estimated beauty 
premium in Column 6 is significantly different from zero, the significance level is marginal and 
the magnitude is not large. The 95% upper bound for this estimate is 0.21 points or about 6% of 
the mean GPA per one standard deviation of attractiveness. The admission rating is highly 
predictive of GPA, demonstrating that it is a useful measure of ex-ante student ability. 
We next examine whether there is heterogeneity by area of study. Specifically, we consider 
GPA separately for five major study areas: sciences, social sciences, humanities, area studies, 
and economics.14 There may be less room for instructor discretion in the sciences. Thus, any 
difference in GPA in this area is more likely to reflect performance differences or selection 
rather than instructor bias. In addition, more attractive students may select into study areas in 
which they have a comparative advantage. 
Table 6 shows the results. More attractive students have a marginally higher GPA in the 
sciences, but there is no significant difference between more and less attractive students in any of 
the other study areas. However, the standard errors on the point estimates are fairly large, and we 
cannot rule out the possibility that the point estimates in all five areas of study are equal to each 
other.  
We next consider the relationship between course-level grades and attractiveness. Because of 
the detailed nature of the course-level data, we are able to include many controls to eliminate the 
selection channel, such as course type (humanities, sciences, social sciences, area studies, 
                                                     
14 For a discussion of how we classify majors and courses into study areas, see Appendix B. 
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economics, and other) and department (e.g., math, French, English). We also include course-
type-by-semester fixed effects, year-of-enrollment fixed effects, race fixed effects, and financial 
aid amounts as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the student level.15 
The results are shown in Table 7 and indicate that there is no significant correlation between 
attractiveness and course-level grades. The point estimates are positive and similar in magnitude 
to those shown in Table 5. The inclusion of SAT scores and admissions ratings increases the 
magnitude of our point estimates, but they remain statistically insignificant. The results are 
robust to excluding the course-level controls listed above, to not controlling for the anti-grade-
inflation policy, and to using only QR test scores or admission ratings as ability controls.16 
We next test for heterogeneity in the beauty premium between small and large courses 
and between male and female instructors. We use two measures of course size—an indicator for 
below- and above-median enrollment (18 or fewer v. 19 or more students) and indicators for 
enrollment size quartiles. We might expect males to be more responsive to female attractiveness 
than females (e.g., Landry et al. 2006). We might also expect the beauty premium to be larger in 
smaller courses because the appearance of individual students is easier to observe.17 
                                                     
15 Including course fixed effects in the course-level regressions does not alter our results. 
However, due to the small number of observations per course (mean of 8, median of 5), we do 
not use course fixed effects in our preferred specification.  
16 For space reasons, we do not show these specifications. Results are available upon request. 
17 Note that “large” courses have 33 students enrolled on average, with 121 students being the 
largest class size in our sample. 
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The results are shown in Table 8. Overall, it appears that there is a modest and marginally 
significant beauty premium in courses taught by female instructors and in courses with above-
median enrollment. There is also a marginally significant beauty premium in the smallest course 
size quartile (13 students or fewer), with more attractive students receiving grades that are 0.027 
points higher. However, as the p-values from the test of equality show, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the rating coefficients in each specification are equal to each other. Moreover, the 
point estimate for courses with below-median enrollment is actually larger than that for courses 
with above-median enrollment. 
Overall, we find little evidence for a meaningful beauty advantage for college grades: 
while more attractive women have a marginally higher GPA overall, they do not receive 
significantly higher grades once we control for a rich set of course characteristics. There is also 
some evidence of a marginal beauty premium in small courses and in courses taught by female 
instructors, but we cannot rule out the null hypothesis of no heterogeneity in these course 
characteristics. Our interpretation of these results is that the role of attractiveness in college 
grades is small and economically insignificant. 
iii. Sorting 
More attractive students do not begin college with better credentials than their less 
attractive peers. They appear to earn marginally better grades during college, all else remaining 
equal, but the differences largely disappear once we introduce extensive course-level controls. 
This suggests that there may be some beauty-based selection, another channel through which the 
beauty premium may occur if more attractive people specialize in areas in which they have a 
comparative advantage. 
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Our final goal then is to explicitly assess whether more attractive students make 
systematically different choices in terms of course and major selection. First, we consider the 
propensity of more attractive students to take courses in five main subject areas: humanities, 
social sciences, science, area studies, and economics. The dependent variable is the percent of 
courses taken by the student in that particular subject area. 
The results are shown in Table 9. Conditional on their test scores and admission ratings, 
more attractive students take 1.59 percentage points more economics courses and 1.92 
percentage points fewer science courses. There is no selection into other social sciences, 
humanities, or area studies courses. The pattern of selection by attractiveness quintile suggests 
that the most attractive women select out of science courses and into economics courses almost 
one-for-one: women in the fourth and fifth quintile of attractiveness take 3.3 and 4.5 percentage 
points fewer science courses, respectively, and 3.0 and 4.4 more economics courses, 
respectively, than the least attractive women. Thus, there is substantial beauty-based selection 
into course areas. 
A natural follow-up question is whether more attractive students are also less likely to 
major in sciences and more likely to major in economics. We investigate this sorting hypothesis 
by regressing an indicator variable for whether the student is in a particular major on her 
attractiveness rating and various controls, using a probit specification. Some students have 
multiple majors and may thus appear in multiple categories. 
The results are shown in Table 10. The estimated coefficients have been scaled by 100 to 
make them easier to read. As expected given the results in Table 9, more attractive students are 
significantly less likely to major in the sciences and significantly more likely to major in 
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economics. The marginal effects at the mean indicate that a one s.d. increase in attractiveness is 
associated with a 5.4% decrease in the probability of majoring in science and a 3.5% increase in 
the probability of majoring in economics. There is no significant selection into humanities, other 
social sciences, or area studies majors. Other majors that make up a significant fraction of the 
sample, namely psychology, English, and political science, likewise show no beauty-based 
selection (results not shown). The selection out of the sciences and into economics is again 
driven by the top two quintiles of attractive women, although the likelihoods appear to change 
monotonically with the quintile. 
Finally, we test for beauty-based sorting into occupations, using a probit model. The 
estimated coefficients, scaled by 100, are shown in Table 11. Because occupation choice occurs 
shortly before or after final GPA is known, we include it as a control. However, our results are 
robust to not controlling for GPA. 
We find that more attractive women are much more likely to become consultants or 
managers and much less likely to enter technical or scientific fields.18 Specifically, a one s.d. 
increase in attractiveness is associated with a 6.4% increase in the probability of becoming a 
consultant or manager and a 2.2% decrease in the probability of becoming a scientist or a 
technician. This is consistent with our earlier results on major choice. There is no significant 
beauty-based selection into administrative fields, art and advertising, or teaching. Similarly, we 
find no selection into the medical or legal professions or into non-profit/government jobs (results 
                                                     
18 Our results are robust to considering “consultant” and “manager” separately, combining 
“lawyer” and “doctor,” combining “doctor” and “other medical,” and considering “art” and 
“advertising” separately. 
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not shown). Although we lack occupation information for almost half of the alumnae in our 
sample, the fact that these findings mirror those in Tables 8 and 9 makes us more certain that 
they are not driven by selective reporting. Moreover, the response rate in our data is similar to 
(and, if anything, slightly higher than) the response rate of the alumnae pool from which we draw 
our sample. 
It is worth considering whether our findings translate into earnings. Although we cannot 
examine the relationship between earnings and attractiveness directly, we can refer to prior 
literature. There is some evidence that SAT scores are positively correlated with post-college 
earnings (Dale and Krueger 2011), as is college GPA (Loury 1997, Arcidiacono 2004, Hershbein 
2013).19 Because none of these papers considers attractiveness specifically and many restrict 
their sample to men, we are hesitant to argue that they extend to our setting. 
There is however more evidence available on the relationship between earnings and 
choice of college major. The existence of earnings differentials across majors is well-
documented (see, e.g., Daymont and Andrisani 1984, Grogger and Eide 1995, Loury 1997, and 
Arcidiacono 2004). Overall, researchers find that students majoring in fields such as 
business/economics, science, and engineering generally earn more than those majoring in 
humanities, education, and other social sciences. These differences persist even after controlling 
for selection on observables (Andrews et al., 2012). Because we find that more attractive women 
are less likely to major in sciences but more likely to major in economics, this previous research 
has ambiguous implications for our findings. 
                                                     
19 Hershbein (2013) finds that this relationship holds only for less selective colleges. 
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In experimental settings, both Arcidiacono et al. (2011) and Wiswal and Zafar (2012) 
show that students’ perceptions of expected earnings and ability are significant predictors of 
major choice. Likewise, Berger (1988) finds that individuals choose majors that they perceive as 
being more likely to provide a larger stream of earnings. Thus, it is likely that some of the 
beauty-based selection in our sample is driven by earnings expectations. 
Alternatively, differential preferences could be driving the observed sorting in our data. 
For example, if more attractive individuals are also more extroverted, they may prefer to enter 
jobs where they are more likely to work with others, even if this does not result in higher wages. 
To our knowledge, however, there is no work showing the existence of a correlation between 
attractiveness and personality traits that would lead a more attractive person to choose one career 
over another, all else (including wages) remaining equal. 
V. Conclusion 
The issue of beauty-based discrimination has gained increasing attention in recent years. 
Prior literature has found that more attractive people earn more on average. However, much 
remains unknown about the origins and evolution of the beauty premium, including whether 
there are differences in academic capability between more and less attractive individuals, and the 
extent of bias and sorting that occurs. We contribute to the literature by considering whether 
there is a beauty advantage before and during college and by estimating the extent to which 
beauty-based sorting occurs. 
We find that more attractive women do not appear more academically capable at the point of 
college admissions. On the contrary, they receive lower admission ratings, even though the 
application readers never directly observe applicant appearance. This is because more attractive 
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women receive lower SAT scores. Although previous researchers have found that standardized 
test scores are positively correlated with measures of cognitive ability (see, e.g., Frey and 
Detterman 2004, Beaujean et al. 2006, Rohde and Thompson 2006, and Koenig et al. 2008), 
these findings do not necessarily contradict earlier findings that more attractive people have 
higher IQs. SAT scores are likely to be a function of both innate ability and effort. It may be that 
more attractive people rationally exert less effort on the SAT because the other advantages 
available to them make it optimal to invest fewer resources into scoring higher on the SATs. 
Testing this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper, but should be a worthwhile avenue for 
future research. 
We find substantial beauty-based sorting into areas of study, with more attractive women 
being significantly less likely to major in the sciences and much more likely to major in 
economics. They are also subsequently less likely to work in science-related or technical fields 
and more likely to become consultants, analysts, or managers. Overall, our findings show that the 
main difference between more and less attractive people during college appears to lie not in the 
grades they receive but rather in the major and career choices they make. 
Unfortunately, we cannot determine whether the observed sorting into majors is socially 
optimal, which is important for estimating welfare effects and deriving policy implications. 
However, even if inefficient sorting is present, policy tools capable of addressing it would be 
controversial and perhaps impossible to implement. 
The results suggest several directions for future research.  First, reproducing the analysis with 
a mixed-gender group of college graduates would enhance our understanding of gender 
differences in the role of appearance in undergraduate education. Second, studying more post-
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graduation outcomes, such as labor force status, earnings, and history of promotions would shed 
light on how the beauty premium for college graduates evolves later, after they have entered the 
labor market. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Above-median attractiveness rating Below-median attractiveness rating 
 
Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs 
Attractiveness rating 0.70*** 0.54 -0.03 2.42 397 -0.69 0.47 -2.69 -0.03 397 
Admission rating 6.34*** 1.36 0 10 397 6.62 1.29 1.67 10 395 
Total GPA 3.48 0.28 2.5 3.98 396 3.48 0.29 2.30 4 396 
Humanities GPA 3.50 0.29 2.11 4 397 3.48 0.32 1.34 4 394 
Social Science GPA 3.5 0.29 2.44 4 395 3.5 0.29 2.00 4 393 
Science GPA 3.24 0.49 1.56 4 395 3.22 0.52 1.40 4 395 
Area studies GPA 3.52 0.38 2.33 4 125 3.48 0.43 2.00 4 140 
Economics GPA 3.23 0.53 1.00 4 223 3.24 0.57 1.00 4 204 
Math SAT score 678*** 62 510 800 387 689 57 490 800 378 
Verbal SAT score 696*** 61 490 800 387 712 59 450 800 378 
Writing SAT score 699* 67 490 800 274 710 66 500 800 277 
QR test score 13.08* 2.65 2 18 397 13.42 2.55 4.5 18 397 
Passed QR test 0.93 0.25 0 1 397 0.95 0.22 0 1 397 
Asian 0.21 0.41 0 1 397 0.22 0.41 0 1 397 
Black 0.03 0.16 0 1 397 0.04 0.2 0 1 397 
White 0.61 0.49 0 1 397 0.64 0.48 0 1 397 
Hispanic 0.05** 0.21 0 1 397 0.02 0.14 0 1 397 
Latina 0.07** 0.26 0 1 397 0.03 0.18 0 1 397 
Need-based loans ($) 1,759 3,438 0 15,795 397 1,492 3,080 0 17,675 397 
Grants ($) 47,524 54,836 0 202198 397 51,202 57,598 0 199368 397 
Other loans ($) 891** 3,424 0 24,700 397 500 1,864 0 14,500 397 
Stars indicate significant differences in means from the “below-median” group. Significance levels: *10 percent, ** 5 
percent, *** 1 percent. Social science GPA excludes economics. 
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Table 2: difference between the general student population and those giving consent 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Math 
SAT 
Verbal 
SAT 
Writing 
SAT 
QR test 
score 
Admission 
rating 
Year 
enrolled 
All students 674 684 683 12.94 6.22 2002 
Consenting minus all 9.13*** 20.08*** 21.36*** 0.31*** 0.26*** 0.53*** 
Observations 5,894 5,894 4,544 6,158 6,155 6,160 
Significance levels: *10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent.  
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Table 3: Attractiveness and admission ratings 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Attractiveness rating -0.131*** 
 
-0.038 
 (0.049) 
 
(0.042) 
 Attractiveness 
quintile = 2  
0.01 
 
0.046 
 
(0.146) 
 
(0.128) 
Attractiveness 
quintile = 3  
0.005 
 
0.131 
 
(0.138) 
 
(0.121) 
Attractiveness 
quintile = 4  
-0.146 
 
-0.027 
 
(0.146) 
 
(0.128) 
Top attractiveness 
quintile  
-0.409*** 
 
-0.128 
 
(0.150) 
 
(0.132) 
Math SAT score 
  
0.432*** 0.429*** 
  
(0.050) (0.050) 
Verbal SAT score 
  
0.408*** 0.409*** 
  
(0.045) (0.045) 
Dep. var. mean 6.48 6.48 6.51 6.51 
Observations 791 791 762 762 
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.35 0.35 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *10 
percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. All regressions include year of 
enrollment and race fixed effects, as well as controls for the amount of 
financial aid received. 
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Table 3: Attractiveness and test scores 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Math SAT Verbal SAT Writing SAT QR test 
Attractiveness 
rating 
-0.10*** 
 
-0.14*** 
 
-0.45* 
 
-0.20** 
 (0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.26) 
 
(0.09) 
 Attractiveness 
quintile = 2  
0.04 
 
-0.14 
 
-1.37 
 
0.00 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.86) 
 
(0.27) 
Attractiveness 
quintile = 3  
-0.12 
 
-0.27** 
 
-1.08 
 
-0.20 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.83) 
 
(0.29) 
Attractiveness 
quintile = 4  
-0.08 
 
-0.30*** 
 
-1.43 
 
-0.31 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.89) 
 
(0.27) 
Top attractiveness 
quintile  
-0.29*** 
 
-0.40*** 
 
-1.22 
 
-0.55** 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.86) 
 
(0.27) 
Dep. var. mean 11.37 11.37 11.59 11.59 70.44 70.44 13.25 13.25 
Observations 764 764 764 764 551 551 793 793 
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. All 
regressions include year-of-enrollment and race fixed effects, as well as controls for the amount of financial 
aid received. 
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Table 5: Attractiveness and GPA 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
First year GPA Overall GPA 
Attractiveness rating -0.003 0.012 
  
0.004 0.016* 
  (0.012) (0.012) 
  
(0.010) (0.010) 
  Attractiveness quintile = 2 
  
-0.076* -0.077* 
  
-0.069** -0.072** 
  
(0.040) (0.040) 
  
(0.032) (0.032) 
Attractiveness quintile = 3 
  
0.009 0.013 
  
-0.001 -0.002 
  
(0.035) (0.035) 
  
(0.028) (0.029) 
Attractiveness quintile = 4 
  
-0.016 -0.002 
  
-0.003 0.007 
  
(0.037) (0.036) 
  
(0.030) (0.028) 
Top attractiveness quintile 
  
-0.041 0.003 
  
-0.020 0.015 
  
(0.037) (0.036) 
  
(0.031) (0.029) 
Math SAT score 
 
0.034** 
 
0.035** 
 
0.017 
 
0.019 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
Verbal SAT score 
 
0.000 
 
-0.001 
 
0.005 
 
0.004 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.011) 
Admission rating 
 
0.072*** 
 
0.071*** 
 
0.059*** 
 
0.060*** 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
Dep. var. mean 3.40 3.41 3.40 3.41 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 
Observations 793 762 793 762 791 760 791 760 
R-squared 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.10 0.18 0.11 0.19 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. All regressions include year-of-
enrollment fixed effects, race fixed effects, and financial aid amounts. 
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Table 6: Attractiveness and GPA by area of study 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Sciences Social Sciences Humanities Area Studies Economics 
Attractiveness 
rating 
0.028* 
 
0.016 
 
0.016 
 
0.031 
 
0.022 
 (0.017) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.027) 
 Attractiveness 
quintile = 2  
-0.073 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.059 
 
-0.054 
 
-0.124 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.082) 
 
(0.087) 
Attractiveness 
quintile = 3  
0.036 
 
-0.011 
 
0.028 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.023 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.076) 
 
(0.085) 
Attractiveness 
quintile = 4  
0.035 
 
0.039 
 
0.013 
 
-0.026 
 
0.046 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.076) 
 
(0.077) 
Top attractiveness 
quintile  
0.036 
 
0.028 
 
0.014 
 
0.077 
 
-0.014 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.077) 
 
(0.077) 
Math SAT score 0.105*** 0.107*** 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.012 0.045 0.051 0.128*** 0.131*** 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031) 
Verbal SAT score -0.017 -0.018 0.013 0.012 -0.002 -0.003 0.010 0.004 0.007 0.007 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.032) (0.032) (0.027) (0.026) 
Admission rating 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.048** 0.051** 0.079*** 0.076*** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Dep. var. mean 3.24 3.24 3.50 3.50 3.49 3.49 3.52 3.52 3.24 3.24 
Observations 759 759 756 756 760 760 251 251 412 412 
R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.24 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. All specifications include year 
and race fixed effects, as well as financial aid controls and controls for math SATs, verbal SATs, and admission rating. 
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Table 7: Attractiveness and course-level grades 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Attractiveness 
rating 
0.003 
 
0.012 
 
0.015 
 (0.011) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 Attractiveness 
quintile = 2  
-0.044 
 
-0.045 
 
-0.046 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.031) 
Attractiveness 
quintile = 3  
-0.006 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.003 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.029) 
Attractiveness 
quintile = 4  
-0.001 
 
0.003 
 
0.009 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.028) 
Top attractiveness 
quintile  
-0.016 
 
0.010 
 
0.021 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.029) 
Math SAT score 
  
0.059*** 0.060*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
  
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Verbal SAT score 
  
0.034*** 0.033*** 0.007 0.006 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Admission rating 
    
0.061*** 0.061*** 
    
(0.009) (0.009) 
Dep. var. mean 3.44 3.44 3.45 3.45 3.45 3.45 
Observations 19,525 19,525 18,872 18,872 18,832 18,832 
R-squared 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 
Standard errors clustered by student in parentheses. Significance levels: *10 percent, 
** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. All regressions include fixed effects for: department, 
course level, semester-by-course type, year of enrollment, and race. In addition, 
controls include the gender of the instructor, total course enrollment (log), and the 
amount of financial aid received by the student. Course level is either beginning, 
intermediate, or advanced. Course type is humanities, social sciences, economics, 
area studies, sciences, or other. Department fixed effects represent a specific 
department code, such as English, Economics, Physics, etc. 
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Table 8: Attractiveness and course-level grades heterogeneity 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female prof x rating 0.007 0.022* 
    (0.013) (0.012) 
    Male prof x rating -0.002 0.013 
    (0.013) (0.012) 
    Below median size x rating 
  
0.007 0.026 
  
  
(0.016) (0.016) 
  Above median size x rating 
  
0.004 0.020* 
  
  
(0.012) (0.011) 
  Bottom quartile x rating 
    
0.008 0.025* 
    
(0.013) (0.013) 
2nd quartile x rating 
    
0.000 0.015 
    
(0.014) (0.013) 
3rd quartile x rating 
    
0.005 0.019 
    
(0.016) (0.015) 
Top quartile x rating 
    
-0.001 0.012 
    
(0.015) (0.014) 
Ability controls 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Test of equality p-value 0.35 0.29 0.77 0.57 
  1st = 2nd quartile p-value 
    
0.48 0.39 
1st = 3rd quartile p-value 
    
0.82 0.66 
1st = 4th quartile p-value 
    
0.46 0.30 
Dep. var. mean 3.44 3.45 3.44 3.45 3.44 3.45 
Observations 19,525 18,832 19,433 18,741 19,433 18,741 
R-squared 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.15 
Standard errors clustered by student in parentheses. Significance levels: *10 percent, ** 5 
percent, *** 1 percent. All regressions include fixed effects for: department, course level, 
semester-by-course type, year of enrollment, and race. In addition, controls include the 
gender of the instructor, total course enrollment (log), and the amount of financial aid 
received by the student. Course level is either beginning, intermediate, or advanced. 
Course type is humanities, social sciences, economics, area studies, sciences, or other. 
Department fixed effects represent a specific department code, such as English, 
Economics, Physics, etc. 
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Table 9: Selection into subject areas 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Sciences Social Science Humanities Area studies Economics 
Attractiveness 
rating 
-1.92*** 
 
0.36 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.01 
 
1.59*** 
 (0.62) 
 
(0.67) 
 
(0.63) 
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.45) 
 Attractiveness 
quintile = 2  
1.95 
 
-4.64** 
 
1.35 
 
0.67 
 
0.84 
 
(1.95) 
 
(2.10) 
 
(1.96) 
 
(0.65) 
 
(1.42) 
Attractiveness 
quintile = 3  
-1.14 
 
-2.72 
 
1.04 
 
0.19 
 
2.11 
 
(1.94) 
 
(2.08) 
 
(1.95) 
 
(0.64) 
 
(1.41) 
Attractiveness 
quintile = 4  
-3.30* 
 
-1.64 
 
2.45 
 
-0.01 
 
2.96** 
 
(1.94) 
 
(2.09) 
 
(1.96) 
 
(0.65) 
 
(1.42) 
Top attractiveness 
quintile  
-4.48** 
 
-0.82 
 
0.51 
 
0.17 
 
4.37*** 
 
(1.96) 
 
(2.11) 
 
(1.97) 
 
(0.65) 
 
(1.43) 
Math SAT score 4.30*** 4.25*** -4.34*** -4.29*** -3.72*** -3.74*** 0.57** 0.56** 3.23*** 3.24*** 
(0.75) (0.75) (0.81) (0.81) (0.75) (0.76) (0.25) (0.25) (0.54) (0.55) 
Verbal SAT score -1.86*** -1.81** 1.16 1.06 2.26*** 2.32*** 0.18 0.18 -1.84*** -1.87*** 
(0.70) (0.70) (0.76) (0.76) (0.71) (0.71) (0.23) (0.23) (0.51) (0.51) 
Admission rating 1.04* 0.99* -0.69 -0.63 -0.25 -0.26 -0.09 -0.09 0.08 0.10 
(0.57) (0.57) (0.61) (0.61) (0.57) (0.57) (0.19) (0.19) (0.41) (0.42) 
Dep. var. mean 0.23 0.23 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.09 
Observations 762 762 762 762 762 762 762 762 762 762 
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.16 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.14 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. Dependent variable is fraction of courses taken in a particular 
subject area. All regressions include year of enrollment and race fixed effects, as well as controls for the amount of financial aid received.  
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Table 10: Selection into majors 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Sciences Social Science Humanities Area Studies Economics 
Attractiveness 
rating 
-18.17*** 
 
3.84 
 
-5.78 
 
10.91 
 
16.49*** 
 (5.51) 
 
(4.88) 
 
(4.97) 
 
(7.00) 
 
(6.05) 
 Attractiveness 
quintile = 2  
-9.35 
 
-26.57* 
 
5.03 
 
9.99 
 
8.48 
 
(15.73) 
 
(15.28) 
 
(15.42) 
 
(22.43) 
 
(19.92) 
Attractiveness 
quintile = 3  
-24.64 
 
-5.02 
 
-1.14 
 
-9.25 
 
17.52 
 
(15.79) 
 
(14.88) 
 
(15.27) 
 
(23.52) 
 
(19.78) 
Attractiveness 
quintile = 4  
-53.37*** 
 
-1.51 
 
9.40 
 
28.61 
 
35.76* 
 
(16.68) 
 
(14.96) 
 
(15.32) 
 
(20.35) 
 
(18.97) 
Top 
attractiveness 
quintile 
 
-45.28*** 
 
0.64 
 
-21.36 
 
33.15 
 
45.08** 
 
(16.69) 
 
(15.19) 
 
(16.09) 
 
(20.42) 
 
(19.13) 
Math SAT score 30.84*** 31.37*** -28.58*** -28.51*** -17.69*** -18.22*** -5.43 -5.64 47.69*** 47.83*** 
(6.56) (6.58) (5.89) (5.88) (5.87) (5.90) (8.04) (8.10) (7.41) (7.49) 
Verbal SAT 
score 
-13.01** -13.04** 5.43 5.15 4.39 4.83 9.20 9.01 -20.09*** -20.51*** 
(6.07) (6.09) (5.34) (5.33) (5.70) (5.68) (7.86) (7.82) (6.55) (6.55) 
Admission 
rating 
4.29 4.11 -3.88 -3.66 -2.03 -2.31 1.60 2.07 -1.69 -1.36 
(4.70) (4.70) (4.45) (4.47) (4.69) (4.71) (6.41) (6.32) (5.52) (5.52) 
Dep. var. mean 0.24 0.24 0.40 0.40 0.34 0.34 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.17 
Observations 760 760 760 760 760 760 760 760 760 760 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. Regression specification is a probit. Dependent variable is an 
indicator for majoring in a given subject area. All regressions include year-of-enrollment and race fixed effects, as well as controls for the amount of financial aid 
received. 
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Table 11: Attractiveness and career choice 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Consultant/manager Administrator Art/advertising Teacher Technical Scientist 
Attractiveness 
rating 
20.42*** 
 
0.42 
 
-1.37 
 
-13.20 
 
-22.56** 
 
-28.19** 
 (7.24) 
 
(7.63) 
 
(8.42) 
 
(10.42) 
 
(9.40) 
 
(11.53) 
 Attractiveness 
quintile = 2  
4.65 
 
-53.31** 
 
-2.26 
 
-38.58 
 
23.68 
 
12.11 
 
(23.28) 
 
(22.79) 
 
(29.20) 
 
(29.05) 
 
(27.98) 
 
(27.35) 
Attractiveness 
quintile = 3  
8.78 
 
-10.30 
 
-0.21 
 
-30.31 
 
31.16 
 
-43.64 
 
(22.90) 
 
(21.36) 
 
(29.08) 
 
(28.15) 
 
(28.13) 
 
(36.21) 
Attractiveness 
quintile = 4  
26.61 
 
-12.09 
 
27.76 
 
-34.78 
 
-85.87** 
 
-48.02 
 
(22.14) 
 
(21.91) 
 
(28.04) 
 
(27.71) 
 
(42.42) 
 
(33.80) 
Top attractiveness 
quintile  
44.08* 
 
-10.37 
 
-22.55 
 
-41.12 
 
-44.57 
 
-62.57* 
 
(23.12) 
 
(22.49) 
 
(30.07) 
 
(30.65) 
 
(36.25) 
 
(36.45) 
Math SAT score 18.38** 17.80** -18.14** -17.67** -17.65* -19.04* -12.92 -12.46 9.53 9.08 4.14 3.06 
(8.92) (8.94) (8.27) (8.29) (9.96) (10.11) (11.17) (11.24) (12.75) (12.84) (12.58) (12.58) 
Verbal SAT score -5.34 -5.89 -3.16 -3.10 14.43 15.99 5.25 4.49 5.82 8.40 -5.06 -4.44 
(8.61) (8.54) (8.56) (8.45) (10.05) (10.30) (10.67) (10.65) (10.23) (10.76) (10.65) (10.81) 
Admission rating -7.12 -6.44 5.30 5.33 -12.63 -12.83 0.82 1.26 -4.12 -8.02 -1.32 -0.27 
(7.37) (7.26) (6.68) (6.64) (8.10) (8.13) (7.47) (7.54) (7.89) (8.03) (7.29) (6.81) 
GPA 41.00 39.89 -25.96 -34.41 12.90 17.16 26.44 24.41 7.40 16.12 -58.41 -50.27 
(28.36) (28.54) (27.18) (27.63) (31.27) (32.64) (37.78) (38.80) (43.80) (44.14) (44.79) (43.70) 
Dep. var. mean 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Observations 413 413 413 413 349 349 413 413 413 413 383 383 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. Regression specification is a probit. Dependent variable is an 
indicator for reporting an occupation in the given area. All regressions include year of enrollment and race fixed effects, as well as controls for the amount of financial 
aid received.  
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Appendix A. Rating procedure and instructions 
 
All alumna pictures were rated by at least 25 female and 25 male raters. Raters were 
students at a college in a different state and were pre-screened to ensure that they were not 
familiar with students from the college of interest. 
Raters were shown pictures of each student and asked to rate her physical appearance on 
a 1–10 point scale. Five of the numbers had descriptions describing the level of attractiveness 
corresponding to that number (see experimental instructions on the next page). Raters were 
instructed to choose the numbers without descriptions if they felt the student’s appearance fell 
between the two descriptions. 
Each rater was shown four sets of about 100 photos. The order of the photos within each 
set was randomized for each rater. In early stages of the experiment, we compared the mean and 
standard deviation of ratings across photo sets to see if having subjects rate 400 pictures led to 
fatigue. There was no significant difference in either the mean or standard deviation of ratings 
for earlier and later sets, which led us to conclude that 400 pictures was not an excessive number. 
We did not use data from three raters who chose 1’s 40% or more of the time. The “1” option 
was the closest to the “Next” button. Thus, these subjects were most likely trying to complete the 
experiment as quickly as possible. 
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You are about to participate in an experiment involving the perception of appearance. Once the 
experiment begins, you will see a photograph of an individual along with the following prompt: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Choose the number that best corresponds to your evaluation. Choose the numbers without 
descriptive text (1, 3, 5, 7, and 9) if you feel the person’s appearance falls between the 
descriptions found in the adjacent numbers.  
 
After you have chosen a number, click “Next.” You will then see another photograph and be 
asked to repeat the procedure. Continue selecting the number you feel best reflects your 
assessment of the individual’s appearance until you are told to stop.  
Instructions for the experiment 
Rate this person's physical appearance using the following scale: 
 
10 strikingly handsome or beautiful 
9 
8 good-looking (above average for age and sex) 
7 
6 average looks for age and sex 
5 
4 quite plain (below average for age and sex) 
3 
2 homely 
1 
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Appendix B. Major, course, and occupation classifications 
Major and course classifications 
Humanities Social Sciences 
Art - History  Africana Studies  
Art - Studio  Anthropology  
Chinese  Environmental Studies  
Cinema and Media Studies  History  
Classical Civilization  International Relations 
Comparative Literature  Peace & Justice Studies 
English  Philosophy  
French  Political Science  
German  Psychology  
Greek  Religion  
Italian Studies  Sociology  
Japanese  Women’s Studies 
Latin  Women’s and Gender Studies 
Media Arts and Sciences  
 Medieval/Renaissance 
Studies 
 Music  
 Russian  
 Spanish  
 Theater Studies  
 
 
 Area Studies Science 
American Studies  Astronomy  
Chinese Studies  Astrophysics  
Classical & Nr Eastern  Biological Chemistry  
East Asian Studies  Biological Sciences  
French Cultural Studies  Chemical Physics 
German Studies  Chemistry  
Jewish Studies  Cognitive & Linguistic Sciences 
Latin American Studies  Computer Science  
Middle Eastern Studies  Geology 
Russian Area Studies  Geosciences  
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South Asia Studies  Mathematics 
 
Neuroscience  
 
Physics  
  Other Economics 
Archeology Economics 
Architecture  
 Education  
 Engineering 
 Linguistics 
 Military science 
 Physical Education 
 Urban studies 
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Occupation classifications 
 
Advertising/art Scientist 
Advertising/marketing Researcher (except economics) 
Political (non-government 
employee) Earth sciences 
Design Chemistry 
Non-technical writing Biology 
Architect Astronomy 
Performing Physics 
Publishing/broadcasting Mathematics 
Museums/galleries Engineering 
  Technician Consultant/manager 
Technician Manager 
Paralegal/legal assistant Consultant 
Technical writer Analysis 
Computer-related work Finance 
 
Economist 
  Administrator/retail Lawyer 
Administrative/human resources Lawyer 
Retail 
 
  Teacher Physician 
Elementary, middle, high school Physician/doctor 
 
Dentist 
 
Psychologist 
Other medical 
 Nurse 
 Health worker 
 Physical therapist 
 Veterinarian 
  
 
